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Abstract
Italy has the lowest labor supply of married women among EU countries. Moreover, the
participation rate of married women is positively correlated with their husbands’
income. We show that these two features can be partly explained by the tax system: a
high tax rate together with tax credits and transfers raise the burden of two-earner
households, generating disincentives to work. We estimate two structural models of
labor supply: one where the husband’s labor supply is inelastic and one with joint
couple decisions. Then we use the estimated parameters to simulate the effects of
alternative revenue-neutral tax systems on labor supply. We find that working tax credit
and gender-based taxation boost it, with the effects of the former being concentrated
on low educated women. Conversely, joint taxation implies a drop in the participation
rate.
JEL codes: J21, J22, H31
Keywords: Female labor force participation; Italian tax system; Second earner tax rate;
Joint taxation; Gender-based taxation; Working tax credit
1 Introduction
The labor force participation of Italian married women is about 60 percent, the low-
est percentage among EU countries. Furthermore, their participation rate is markedly
increasing by percentile of husband’s earnings. We argue that the taxation system partly
explains the coexistence of these two features.
Even thought the influence of the taxation system is not necessarily the first mecha-
nism that comes to mind when thinking about labor supply, there are several reasons that
point to its relevance. First, the unusual positive correlation between participation rate
and husband’s income leads us to exclude mechanisms which would affect all households
in a similar way. Second, in Italy, the individual (not the household) constitutes the basic
unit of taxation. This implies that the first euro of earned income for a married woman is
taxed as the first euro of the husband’s income, and not as the last euro like in countries
where joint filing is allowed. Third, the tax system is characterized by a set of tax credits
and cash transfers for children and non-working spouses, which are decreasing functions
of the household income.
The combination of these elements raises the tax burden, especially on two-earner
households, generating disincentives to participate in the labor force for married women
who are typically the second earner of the family. Such disincentives are stronger when the
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first earner’s income is low. More specifically, the incidence of tax credits and universal
cash transfers on the second earner tax rate decreases in total income, providing incen-
tives to participate that are higher for richer households1. Concretely, the second earner
tax rate reaches amaximum at low levels of husbands’ yearly earnings, namely 8,000 euros
for childless couples, and 19,000 euros for couples with children. The overall effect of this
design is that earnings of married women decrease the amount of transfers received by
the households when they enter the labor market, primarily discouraging participation,
but also part-time and low skill jobs2.
We propose a simple theoretical model to convey the main testable implications. Then,
we use micro data from the EU-SILC (2007-2011) to estimate two more complex struc-
tural models of labor supply that take into account the participation decision of married
females in two-earner households, as well as its interplay with the structure of hetero-
geneity and taxation. In the benchmark model, men’s labor supply is exogenous, while
in the extended model, couples take decisions simultaneously. In both models household
non-labor income is given, and the labor supply decision is taken sequentially: each part-
ner decides whether to search for a job, and upon receiving an offer, to accept it or not.
Participation decisions depend on the net yearly income and are therefore affected by the
characteristics of the taxation system. Themodels are able to reproduce the low participa-
tion rate of Italian women as well as the positive correlation between wives’ participation
rate and husbands’ income. They also match the part-time and full-time employment
rates.
We use our framework to conduct three hypothetical (revenue-neutral) tax reform
experiments and then ask: what is the importance of the labor-supply responses of mar-
ried women? We concentrate on joint family taxation (in line with the French system),
gender-based taxation (as proposed by Alesina et al. (2011)), and a system inspired by the
(British and American) working tax credit3. The simulated tax systems are characterized
by the same taxation rates but differ in the set of tax credits and transfers. Our work
suggests that these alternative systems could boost women’s participation up to at most
4 percentage points and increase part-time employment by 2 percent. In particular, the
working tax credit and the gender-based system raise the labor supply of all women. The
effects of the former concentrates on low educated women, and hence, on low skill and
part-time jobs. The reason is that in-work transfers are means of passing income towards
low revenue families conditional on working, incentivizing work and avoiding poverty
traps implied by excessive marginal tax rates. In the gender-based system, the reduced
tax burden generates a positive shift of the participation rate. But the tax credits for
dependent spouses and children leave unchanged the negative incentives for low-income
households. By contrast, we show that joint taxation implies a substantial drop in the par-
ticipation of married women and a negative correlation between participation rate and
husband’s income.
Finally, to assess the welfare effects from our experiments, we compute the Gini coef-
ficient and several poverty measures. We show that the gender-based system increases
the well-being of all households, reducing the transfers needed to reach the poverty
line.
Related literature Our paper is connected to three strands of literature. First, it relates to
recent works which argue that the taxation system may create a set of incentives for labor
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force participation and that it plays an important role in explaining cross-country differ-
ences in labor supply behavior. Some examples are Prescott (2004), Davis and Henrekson
(2004), Rogerson (2006), and Olovsson (2009).
Second, our work belongs to the rich stream of empirical literature on labor supply.
A fundamental role in addressing the relevance of taxation has been played by Burtless
and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980), and Hausman (1985). Another important paper
in this branch is the one by Colombino and Del Boca (1990). We enrich their results by
showing that the model is able to reproduce the positive correlation between wife’s labor
force participation rate and husband’s income.
Third, several studies examine the effect of tax reforms on labor force participation. Up
to twenty years ago, the theoretical literature on optimal taxation converged to a scenario
characterized by a basic income transfer and an almost flat income tax. More recently,
the literature focused on in-work benefits (Aaberge et al. (2000), Saez (2002), Immervoll
et al. (2007), Mooij (2008), and Blundell et al. (2011)). Several studies have evaluated the
expected labor supply effects from introducing in-work tax credits in the U.S. and U.K.
The most recent and relevant studies are (Blundell et al. (2000) and Blundell and Hoynes
(2004) for the U.K., andMeyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Fang and Keane (2004)) for the
U.S. They show that there are strong incentive effects from tax credits. The broadening of
the tax credit seems to have contributed to the increase in labor force participation and
to have reduced welfare. We find that their outcomes also apply to Italy. Our results are
also consistent with the findings of Eissa and Liebman (1996), Cavalli and Fiorio (2006),
and Bar and Leukhina (2009).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some empirical evidence
that motivates the choice of Italy. We describe the Italian taxation system and propose a
simple theoretical model. In Section 3, we specify the empirical strategy, we describe the
data, and present the results. In Sections 4 and 5, we measure the behavioral effects of
alternative tax systems. Section 6 concludes.
2 Labor market and taxation system in Italy
2.1 Empirical evidence
In this section, we describe the main characteristics of the Italian labor market in 2007-
2011 and how it differs from the other EU-SILC countries, especially Spain4. In Table 1, we
can see that, on average, about 74 percent of women aged 26-54 years old are employed.
The number is over 83 percent for men.
There are large cross-country differences in the gender gap, which is about 9 percent
on average, and 13 percent for Spain. Italy stands out for a gender employment gap of
almost 20 percentage points and for one of the lowest employment rates of women, which
is about 16 percentage points lower than the average and 9 percentage points lower than
Spain5.
Table 1 Employment Rates for 26-54 years old, by gender, 2007-2011
Men Women
Total Full-time Part-time Total Full-time Part-time
Average 83.13 80.69 2.48 74.53 62.18 12.41
Italy 76.45 73.47 3.02 58.38 44.02 14.39
Spain 80.01 77.02 3.00 67.40 53.69 13.73
Source: Authors’ computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
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There are also gender gaps in the intensity of employment participation. In almost all
of the countries, a much larger share of female employment is part-time when compared
to male employment, with an average of 12 percent for women and only 2 percent for
men. While both full- and part-time employment rates of Italian men are in line with the
European average, the full-time rate of Italian women seems to depress their total rate.
The importance of part-time employment for women has been at the center of numerous
debates among academic economists and policy makers. In 2003, the Italian government
approved a law that aimed to increase the flexibility of the existing part-time legisla-
tion, having only a limited impact on the difference in part-time employment with other
countries6.
The gender gap is very large in the general participation rate, as shown in Table 2. Italy
has one of the lowest participation rates of women and a gender participation gap of about
16 percentage points against an average gap of 10 percentage points7.
The marital status considerably affects the decision to participate, with married women
having a participation rate that is 10 percentage points lower than unmarried women.
This gap is particulary strong in Italy, where it reaches about 15 percentage points. More-
over, participation rates tend to be lower for mothers. On average, 75 percent of married
mothers are in the labor force, but only 59 percent in Italy.
Another important feature of the Italian labor market can be observed in Figure 1,
where we can see that the labor force participation of married women is positively corre-
lated to their husbands’ yearly income. More specifically, the participation rate is below
55 percent for husband’s yearly gross labor earnings lower than 20,000 euros (second per-
centile); it increases up to about 70 percent at husbands’ earnings of 30,000 euros (sixth
percentile) to remain at that same level in correspondence of the highest percentiles of
income.
This is in contrast with the other countries, including Spain, where the labor force par-
ticipation appears to be inelastic. To the best of our knowledge these characteristics of
the Italian labor force participation of married women has not been explored in the liter-
ature, and it is one of the facts that strongly motivated our project. In particular, we argue
that the Italian taxation system provides a system of disincentives that makes low-income
households choose to remain out of the labor force in order to receive tax credits and cash
transfers.
To get a measure of the correlation between the labor force participation of married
women and the various demographic variables available in the EU-SILC dataset, we run a
simple probit regression of this kind:
Pr(Y = 1|X) = (X′β), (1)
Table 2 Labor force participation for 26-54 years old, 2007-2011
Married women Unmarried women
Women Men w/children w/o children w/children w/o children
Average 78.99 87.43 75.04 77.28 83.20 86.87
Italy 65.99 82.56 58.72 61.33 74.62 80.76
Spain 75.34 86.53 69.16 67.39 83.08 89.41
Source: Authors’ computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).





















Figure 1 Labor force participation of women by percentile of husband’s income. Source: Authors’
computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
where Pr(Y = 1|X) denotes the conditional probability of participating in the labor mar-
ket,  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, and the
vector of parameters β is estimated by maximum likelihood8.
We allow the propensity scores to depend on the woman’s marital status, on the hus-
band’s employment status, and his yearly gross earnings if she is married. Moreover, we
control for some demographic characteristics such as the presence of children, age, edu-
cation level, and household non-labor income. We also add year fixed effects. We run a
separate regression for Italy and the rest of the countries considered in our data analy-
sis. Results are in Table 3. Table 14 in Additional file 1: Appendix C reports the marginal
effects of the control variables for all the EU-SILC countries.
The signs of the marginal effects on the usual demographic variables are consistent
across countries. While the data for the EU and Spain satisfy the standard income pool-
ing hypothesis, showing a negative correlation between husband’s earnings and labor
force participation, Italy behaves differently. That is, a significant positive marginal effect
of 0.021 characterizes Italian data, versus a negative coefficient of 0.020 for the aver-
age of the countries, or 0.039 for Spain. These numbers imply that a 1 percent increase
in husband’s earnings decreases the probability of participating in the labor force by 3.9
Table 3 Probit - marginal effects
Husband’s Household Controls Year fixed effects Log likelihood Obs.
earnings non-labor income
EU-SILC -0.020*** -0.026*** YES YES -109533.990 238189
(0.001) (0.000)
Italy 0.021*** -0.016*** YES YES -12111.044 19361
(0.006) (0.003)
Spain -0.039*** -0.002 YES YES -5759.401 10392
(0.008) (0.002)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Source: Authors’ computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
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percent in Spain, but it increases it by 2.1 percent in Italy. Such results are particularly
surprising because we would expect household income pooling to discourage women
from participating in the labor market, especially for those married to high income
husbands. Interestingly, this anomaly is not observed for the non-labor household
income, which negatively impacts the probability to participate in all countries9.
In summary, the Italian labor market exhibits distinctive features. There is a disparity
between men and women in the participation rate, mainly regarding married couples.
Moreover, once employed, Italian women are much less likely to have a full-time jobs
than in other European countries. In what follows, we bridge these facts to the Italian tax
system.
2.2 The Italian tax system
In this section, we describe the main characteristics of the Italian taxation system. More
technical details can be found in Additional file 1: Appendix A.
We define the second earner of a household as the worker with the second highest
income in the family10. Generally, in a married couple, the husband is considered to be
the first earner who participates in the labor market with certainty. The wife is the second
earner. Her decision to participate depends on several economic and non economic vari-
ables11. In particular, it depends on the fraction of her expected gross income that will
be disposable, net of total taxes. To understand the impact of taxes on the decision to
work, we make use of the concept of the second earner tax rate, a tax rate on labor force
participation, as in Eissa et al. (2005).
Let us define the second earner tax rate (SET) as follows:
SET ≡ Taxwf =
Tax(wm,wf ) − Tax(wm, 0)
wf
,
where Tax(wm,wf ) and Tax(wm, 0) are the total income taxes paid by the household if the
wife works and if she does not work, respectively. wf is her gross income when she works,
and wm is the husband’s gross income. We assume that her income is equal to zero when
she does not work (i.e., she is either out of the labor force or unemployed).
Now, depending on the unit of the fiscal system (individual or family), the second
earner tax rate and the average tax rate of a married woman may be significantly different
than those of an unmarried woman12. In Italy, however, we should not observe a mari-
tal status dependence of the amount of tax paid because the tax system is based on the
individual and not on the household. Nevertheless, tax credits for family dependents and
universal cash transfers for children are decreasing functions of the household income
and indirectly affect the fiscal burden related to the labor force participation status of the
wife. Hence, the SET can be expressed as the sum of taxes on the wife’s individual labor
income T(wf ) and the change in household-based transfers F(wm,wf ) in the following
way:
SET = T(wf )wf +
F(wm, 0) − F(wm,wf )
wf
Since 2007, the tax system grants a tax credit for dependent spouses who earn less than
2,840.51 euros a year, a very low labor income. The amount of tax credits for dependent
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spouses varies between 0 and 730 euros depending on the total household income. To
better understand the incidence of the distortion, consider the following examples:
(1) Assume that an unmarried woman (not currently employed) receives an offer to
work part-time earning 7,200 euros a year. As the current taxation system includes a
no-tax area for yearly income lower than 8,000 euros, her net disposable income
would increase by 7,200 euros a year. She would pay a SET of 0.
(2) Assume now that this same woman is married to an employed man earning 35,000
euros a year. The tax credit system would grant 720 euros to the household if she did
not work. If she were to accept the job offer, she would not depend on the husband
anymore, and he would not receive the tax credit. The household disposable income
would not increase by 7,200 euros a year, but by 6,480 euros a year, i.e. (7, 200− 720).
She would pay a SET equal to 10 percent (720/7, 200).
(3) Assume the husband earns 50,000 euros a year. The tax credit system would grant
517.50 euros to the household if she did not work. She would pay a SET equal to 7.18
percent (517.50/7, 200).
(4) Assume the husband earns 100,000 euros a year. He would not receive the tax credit
and the SET would be zero.
These examples show that the amount of tax credits decreases with the total household
income, and it is zero for incomes higher than 95,000 euros a year. The universal cash
transfers for children put a similar mechanism at work in married households. On the
contrary, they have the positive effect of reducing the fiscal burden of unmarried mothers
and create positive incentives to their participation rate (as in example (1)).
Figure 2 plots the SET on earnings of women for different levels of gross yearly earnings.
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Figure 2 Second earner tax rate by marital status. Source: authors’ simulations.
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given level of husbands’ gross yearly earnings of 19,000 euros. The figures in the right
column plot the SET on earnings against husbands’ gross yearly earnings at a level of
women’s gross yearly earnings of 11,000 euros13. The top panel is for women without
children, and the bottom panel is for women with two dependent children.
In panel a), we can see that the married-unmarried difference in SET is particu-
larly relevant for low women’s earnings (less than 4,000 euros) and dies down as the
income increases. The pick of the SET of married women occurs in correspondence with
yearly earnings of about 3,500 euros. At that point, husbands are not entitled to receive
a tax credit for dependent spouses, and the SET jumps from 9 to about 30 percent.
These couples face a trade-off between having the wife participating in the labor mar-
ket earning a very low salary and not receiving tax credits (but still increasing the total
household income) versus not participating and paying lower taxes (because of the tax
credits).
In panel b), the SET of married women is constant and equal to the one of unmarried
women until a level of husband’s income of about 8,000 euros. In the interval [0, 8, 000]
euros, the husband’s income belongs to the no-tax area, and only his wife’s earnings are
subject to taxation. After that point, both incomes are taxed and the SET increases to
about 20 percent. It is worth noting that the SET remains high formedium levels of house-
hold incomes to decrease and reach the second earner tax rate of unmarried women for
husbands’ earnings in the highest percentiles.
In panel c) and d), we plot the SET of households with children. We can see that (low
earnings) unmarried mothers are subject to negative taxation, as they are eligible for uni-
versal cash transfers for dependent children which are higher than the amount of taxes
that they are supposed to pay. Married mothers are subject to a higher SET because of the
(lower) amount of universal cash transfers for dependent children agreed to the husband.
The SET reaches a peak of 40 percent for wife’s earnings of about 3,200 euros. As in panel
a), the difference between the tax paid by married and unmarried women decreases with
their earnings. In panel d), we can see more clearly the impact of the universal cash trans-
fers for dependent children. The SET of married mothers is increasing up to yearly gross
husband’s earnings of about 19,000 euros. After that point, the decreasing cash trans-
fers for dependent children and spouses diminish the difference between taxes to pay if
working or not working.
Now, we take a closer look at the impact of taxes by marital status in Figure 3. In panel
a), we observe that unmarried women with children have a SET which is much lower
than that of unmarried women without children, as the former receive cash transfers for
the dependent children. On the contrary, for married women (panel b)), the presence of
children negatively affects the SET. Comparing the levels of SET between married and
unmarried women by presence of children, we observe that the difference is significa-
tively positive for low-income mothers whose husbands are entitled to receive tax credits
and transfers. But it is very close to zero for higher incomes and, in general, for childless
women.
In summary, the Italian tax system, even if based on individuals and not on households,
generates a set of negative incentives to female labor force participation. This is due to
universal cash transfers and tax credits for dependent children and spouses that increase
the second earner tax rate of married relative to unmarried women. The distortion is
increasing with the number of children and reaches a maximum at a level of husband’s
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Figure 3 Second earner tax rate bymarital status and presence of children. Source: authors’ simulations.
gross yearly earnings of about 8,000 euros for childless couples and 19,000 euros for
couples with children.
2.3 Theoretical model
We outline a simple static labor supply model to show how some characteristics of the
Italian taxation system might relate to the unusual negative correlation between labor
force participation of married women and their husbands’ income discussed above. The
complete and more complex empirical model will be derived in the next section.
We consider the discrete choice problem of a woman who, upon receiving a job offer,
must decide whether to work at wage wf 14. We assume that her utility is separable in
household income and leisure. Following the previous notation, we distinguish between
T(w), the gross tax schedule based on individual labor income w, and F(wm,wf ), the
transfers granted to employed workers based on total household income, such as tax
allowances for dependent spouses and cash transfers for dependent children. We assume
that T ′ > 0,T ′′ ≥ 0, F ′ < 0 and F ′′ < 0. These assumptions are justified by the fact that
fiscal systems are typically progressive, i.e., the marginal tax rate is increasing in income
and the tax credit is granted only to families with an income below a given threshold.




α if she stays out of the labor force (or unemployed),
wf − T(wf ) + F(0,wf ) if she works,
(2)
where α denotes her leisure utility and her unemployment income is normalized to 0.
Similarly for a married woman:
U =
{
wm − T(wm) + F(wm, 0) + α if she stays out of the labor force (or unemployed),
wm + wf − T(wm) − T(wf ) + F(wm,wf ) if she works,
(3)
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with wm denoting her husband’s gross earnings. A woman will work if her value of leisure
α is higher than the net benefit from employment
α ≥ wf −
[
T(wf ) − F(0,wf )
]
if she is unmarried, (4)




F(wm, 0) − F(wm,wf )
]}
otherwise. (5)
By comparing (4) and (5), we observe that married women face a higher second earner tax:
it includes not only the gross tax T(wf ) but also the potential drop in transfers granted
to her husband F(wm, 0) − F(wm,wf ). Moreover, such an effect is larger for a low-income
worker’s spouse: since F ′′ < 0, and the additional implicit taxation F(wm, 0)−F(wm,wf ) is
decreasing in wm. Intuitively, a rich husband will not benefit from any transfer, no matter
what the employment status of his wife is.
3 Estimation and results
3.1 The models and the empirical specifications
Our policy evaluation methodology relies on a static microeconometric labor supply
model. We extend the simple theoretical framework presented in the previous section in
order to encompass workers’ and jobs’ heterogeneity and include labor market participa-
tion choice15. The key feature of our modeling framework is the exact representation of
tax and transfer schemes when estimating the model.
It is important to underline that we will report several simulation results in relation
with the marital status of the agents. That is: (i) the implied choices of unmarried men
and women, separately estimated; and (ii) the simultaneous choices of spouses. For case
(ii), we will show the differences in the elasticities of women’s probability of participation
both when husband’s participation choice is taken as given (as in (Kleven et al. 2009)) and
when it is endogenous. Note that in the case of inelastic husband’s labor supply, women
solve a similar problem to that of unmarried women, where husband’s employment status
and earnings are taken into account.
We build a two-stage static model of labor supply. Consider a one-person decision prob-
lem16. In the first stage, an agent decides whether to join the labor market and search
for a job. If she does, she enters the second stage and receives, for each possible amount
of working time h ∈ H ⊂ +, a job offer characterized by a level of gross yearly earn-
ings w(h). She can accept one of them or reject them all and stay unemployed (h = 0).
The problem is discretized in the sense that the choice of hours is supposed to be made
between few alternatives: part-time, full-time, or unemployment. The idea is simply that
there generally are commonly agreed durations of work in the labor market, including
the possibility not to work at all. This is relatively realistic and particularly appropriate in
the case of Italy where social and institutional norms as well as demand-side rigidities are
strong and imply concentrations around a limited number of hour choices. Thus, when
modeling unmarried individuals or inelastic husband’s labor supply, the set of alternatives
(h = 1, . . . ,H) corresponds to H work durations. In the case of joint spouses’ choices,
participation and employment decisions are taken simultaneously by the two partners,
and there will be H2 combinations of spouses’ labor supplies.
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The complex structure of the tax system implies that the disposable income is a func-
tion of total household income and household composition. Extensively, the disposable






)+ wm(hm) + y − T (wm(hm)) − T (wf (hf ))+ Fi (wm(hm),wf (hf )) if i is a married couple,
wj(h) + y − T(wj(h)) + Fi(0,wj(h)) otherwise,
(6)
where j = {f ,m}. wf and wm are the labor earnings of women and men, respectively; y
is net household non-labor income; Fi(wm,wf ) denotes transfers from the government;
and T(w) are taxes on gross earnings. In the rest of the section, the spousal gross wage
wm(hm) is taken as given if husband’s labor supply is inelastic.
We assume that the household preferences are described by a linear stochastic util-
ity function U(·) which depends on the alternative h, household disposable income D(·),
and a set of exogenous socio-demographic characteristics Z which account for observed




α(hf ,hm) + β(hf ,hm)Di + γ(hf ,hm)Zi + i(hf ,hm) if i is a married couple,
αh + βhDi + γhZi + ih otherwise.
(7)
Notice that the effect of all variables included in Z varies with h17. In the case of inelas-
tic husband’s labor supply, the set of explanatory variables Z contains controls for the
labor market status of the husband. The difference (αh − α0) + (γh − γ0)Zi captures the
disutility of working (utility of leisure) an amount of time h. Finally, i is a stochastic error
component18.
We solve the problem by backward induction, starting from stage 2. A household i will
maximize utility
Vi(wf (hf ),wm(hm), y,Z) = max{hf ,hm} Ui(hf , hm,D(wf ,wm, y),Z) if i is a married couple, (8)
Vi(wj(hj), y,Z) = max{hj} Ui(hj,D(wj(hj), y),Z) otherwise. (9)
The expressions for Vi(wf (hf ), 0, y,Z) and Vi(0,wm(hm), y,Z) are straightforward ana-
logues of equation (8). In this stage, a household i faces a trade-off between the utility from
non working (enjoying leisure and carrying out domestic work) and working, augmenting
the disposable income of the household.
In stage 1, members of household i decide whether or not to enter the labor market.
To make their choice, they compare the utility from not participating and the expected
utility from entering the labor market. Let c be the cost of entering the labor market and
E
[
Vi(·)] be the expected utility generated by the maximization problem in stage 2. Then,
max
{
Ui(0, 0,D(0, 0, y),Z),E
[
Vi(wf (hf ),wm(hm), y,Z)







]− ci} otherwise, (11)
and two additional problems similar to (10) for Vi(wf (hf ), 0, y,Z) and Vi(0,wm(hm), y,Z).
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We know that if  is i.i.d. according to a type I extreme value distribution, the probability
of observing an individual in the labor market, opting for a choice hj = kj or a couple
choosing {hf = kf , hm = km}, is
Pr(kf , km) = e










for j = f,m. (13)
Moreover, Pr(kf , 0) and Pr(0, km) can be computed in the same fashion as (12).
Similarly, the probability of participating is





eUi(0,0,D(0,0,y),Z) +∑f={0,wf (hf )}∑m={0,wm(hm)} eE[Vi(f ,m,y,Z)]−ci(f ,m) , (14)





eUi(0,D(0,y),Z) + eE[Vi(wj ,y,Z)]−ci for j=f,m, (15)
where s indicates the labor market status.
3.2 The data and wage imputation
We use micro data from the EU-SILC, the Community Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions. The survey collects information relating to a broad range of issues in relation
to income and living conditions. SILC is conducted by the Statistics Offices of the Euro-
pean countries involved in the project on an annual basis in order to monitor changes in
income and living conditions over time.
Every person aged 16 years and over in a household is required to participate in the
survey. Two different types of questions are asked in the household survey: household
questions, and personal questions. The former covers details of accommodation and
facilities together with regular household expenses (mortgage repayments, etc.). This
information is supplied by the head of the household. The latter covers details on vari-
ables such as work, income, and health and are obtained from every household member
aged 16 years and over. We combine household and personal information to construct a
data set which contains information on the spouse of the interviewed household member.
We focus on the cross-sectional information of the years 2007-201119. We restrict the
sample to women aged 26-54 years to avoid the modeling of schooling and retirement
decisions. Moreover, we exclude self-employed men and women and individuals that are
coded as disabled or unfitted to work. Descriptive statistics are in Table 13, Additional
file 1: Appendix B.
The data set provides information on gross labor income of all members of the house-
hold (wm,wf ), and total household income. By difference, it is possible to compute the
non-labor income y. Nevertheless, it is necessary to compute the potential income for all
possible labor supply choices h ∈ H , including the non-employed. To correct for selection
bias, a two-stage non-linear procedure is adopted which departs in few features from the
standard Heckman correction.
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We consider a model in which individuals i are sorted into 4 categories 0, . . . , 3 on the
basis of an ordered-probit selection rule:




0“out of the labor force” if − ∞ < z∗i ≤ μ1,
1“unemployed” if μ1 < z∗i ≤ μ2,
2“part-time employed” if μ2 < z∗i ≤ μ3,
3“full-time employed” if μ3 < z∗i < ∞,
where γ is an unknown vector of parameters, ui is a standard normal shock, and the
unknown cutoffs μ1,μ2,μ3 satisfy μ1 < μ2 < μ3. We assume that the independent
variables ti, vectors of demographic characteristics of agent i and her spouse, and the
categorial variable zi are observed, but the latent selection variable z∗i is unobserved.
We also consider an observed dependent variable wi, the wage, that is a linear func-
tion of some observed demographic characteristics of agent i and her spouse xi, but the




β ′0xi + νi0 if zi = 0,
β ′1xi + νi1 if zi = 1,
β ′2xi + νi2 if zi = 2,
β ′3xi + νi3 if zi = 3,
where for each j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, νij has a mean 0, a variance σ 2j , and is bivariate normal
with ui, with correlation ρj. We assume that the shocks νij and ui are independently and
identically distributed across observations. Our goal is to estimate the parameter vectors
β0, . . . ,β3. wi could also be missing for certain categories j, in which case βj, ρj, and σj do
not exist.
Since only one category j is observed for each individual and the observations are inde-
pendent, the correlations between νij and νik for j = k cannot be identified, so we do not
model or estimate them.
We proceed with a two-step estimation procedure that is a generalization of Heckman’s
(1979) estimator for the binary case. In the first step, we estimate (16) by an ordered
probit of z on t, yielding the consistent estimates γˆ , μˆ1, μˆ2, μˆ3. Define zˆ∗i ≡ tiγˆ and λi ≡








)−  (μˆj − zˆ∗i ) , (17)
where j = zi. Using E [wi|zi, ti, xi] = β ′j xi + ρjσjλi, we can consistently estimate βj with
OLS regressions of w on x and λˆ by using only the observations i for which zi = j20.
3.3 Estimation results
To assess the properties of the model, we first examine its ability to reproduce the
basic features of labor force participation and employment observed in our sample by
comparing model simulations to observed data.
Table 4 and Table 16 in Additional file 1: Appendix C summarize the results of the
estimations of the labor force participation and employment rates (part-time and full-
time). The models replicate the percentage of men and women in the labor force and the










Table 4 Estimation results (%)
Total Unmarried women Unmarried men Married women Married men Married women
Inelastic husband’s labor supply
Taxation Women Men With Without With Without With Without
System children children children children children children
Average Tax Rate of Households
Benchmark Model 24.13 22.05 24.52 23.46 28.03 20.24 27.38
Second Earner Tax Rate
Benchmark Model 25.26 29.47 22.05 24.52 26.75 27.21 35.33 31.57 21.18 25.97
Participation Rate
Data 64.18 81.72 80.94 81.71 58.06 60.97 81.97 81.00 58.06 60.97
Benchmark Model 64.42 82.09 81.98 82.35 58.10 61.16 82.02 81.25 58.11 61.18
Employment Rate: Part-time
Data 14.62 3.33 11.45 4.52 16.99 11.28 1.98 2.70 16.99 11.28
Benchmark Model 14.62 3.33 11.45 4.52 16.99 11.28 1.98 2.70 16.99 11.28
Employment Rate: Full-time
Data 43.71 72.84 59.40 68.35 36.62 45.12 77.95 75.30 36.62 45.12
Benchmark Model 43.71 72.84 59.40 68.35 36.62 45.12 77.95 75.30 36.62 45.12
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Figure 4 plots the realized and predicted labor force participation rates of married
women by percentile of husbands’ incomes. Themodel with inelastic husband’s labor sup-
ply slightly underestimates the participation rates of women married to husbands in the
lowest percentile and overestimates the participation of higher income wives. The model
with joint decisions delivers a more precise match.
A similar trend for married women is confirmed in panel (a) of Figure 5, where the
realized and predicted participation rates are plotted against the household’s disposable
income. In panel (b) of the same figure, we plot the participation rates of husbands, show-
ing that it is inelastic to the household’s disposable income. Interestingly, a similar trend
is obtained if participation rates are plotted against wife’s income (red lines).
As a final validation exercise, we plot the estimated participation rates by age and mar-
ital status in Figure 6. We can observe that both models generate the levels and the
decreasing trend of the participation rate of the different subgroups of women. Even
though the taxation system is not age-dependent, the age of women is correlated with
their own potential earnings, their husband’s earnings, and the number of children. As we
described above, all of these elements affect the tax burden, and hence, the labor decision
of second earners21.
3.4 Uncompensated labor supply elasticities
The parameter estimates of our models do not directly reveal the sensitivity of labor sup-
ply to financial incentives. Hence, in this section, we provide labor supply elasticities for
several subgroups of the sample. Uncompensated elasticities for both spouses’ wage rates
are relevant to analyze because they are the main driving force behind the tax policy
effects.
The elasticities are derived by predicting labor supply for each individual when the
gross wages are increased by 1 percent. The estimates are based on 100 sets of sim-
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Figure 4 Labor force participation - data vs models. Source: authors’ computations from EU-SILC data
(2007-2011).
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Figure 5 Labor force participation - data vs models. Source: authors’ computations from EU-SILC data
(2007-2011).
before the increase in the wages. Individual responses are averaged across individuals to
yield aggregate labor supply elasticities. Note that the elasticities depend on preferences,
demographic and educational structure, and tax functions. The results are in Table 5.
The own wage elasticity of married men is numerically smaller than the wage elastic-






















































(c) Inelastic Husband's Labor Supply
Figure 6 LFP and employment rates of italian women by age - data vs model. Source: authors’









Table 5 Uncompensated labor supply elasticities
Male elasticities Female elasticities
Single Married Single Married
Joint decisions Inelastic husband’s
Labor supply
Own wage Ownwage Cross wage Own-wage Ownwage Cross wage Ownwage Cross wage
All 0.683 0.585 0.134 0.363 1.015 -0.055 0.741 0.824
10% poorest 0.767 0.732 0.080 0.322 0.801 -0.056 0.613 0.205
80% in the middle 0.651 0.523 0.135 0.365 1.049 -0.059 0.748 0.866
10% richest 0.844 0.453 0.185 0.387 0.950 -0.027 0.827 1.165
North-East 0.482 0.529 0.156 0.307 1.093 -0.046 0.534 0.637
North-West 0.532 0.596 0.140 0.272 1.040 -0.083 0.757 0.911
Center 0.804 0.475 0.129 0.400 1.067 -0.028 0.897 1.037
South 0.846 0.742 0.120 0.425 0.950 -0.061 0.771 0.773
Islands 0.827 0.576 0.113 0.458 0.789 -0.074 0.700 0.666
w/o children 0.682 0.344 0.160 0.410 0.922 -0.071 0.678 0.694
with children 0.768 0.658 0.126 -0.238 1.043 -0.051 0.760 0.863
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rest of the table, we illustrate the variation of the labor supply elasticities with disposable
household income, geographical area of residence, and presence of children.
The own wage elasticities of married men are decreasing with household disposable
income, while the opposite is true for married women (in both models). This is in line
with the system of negative incentives provided to wives living in low-income households.
The cross wage elasticity of married women (in the joint decision model) is negative
and increasing in household disposable income. By contrast, the cross wage elasticity of
married men is positive and increasing in household disposable income. It is estimated to
be 0.134, on average, for men (about a fourth of the corresponding own wage elasticity)
and -0.055 for women. This means that a 10 percent increase in spousal wage causes
a 1.34 percent increase in husband’s participation rate and a 0.55 percent decrease in
wife’s participation rate. Hence, changes in wage differences in the family may lead to
within-household divergence in participation.
An important feature distinguishes the joint decisionmodel from themodel with inelas-
tic husband’s labor supply: In the latter, the cross wage elasticity of wives is positive for all
levels of household income. This suggests that assuming a perfectly inelastic labor supply
of husbands may deliver an inaccurate analysis of spousal responses to wage increases.
Single women have an own wage elasticity which is lower than the elasticity of men.
In general, unmarried agents have an elasticity which is increasing with household’s
disposable income.
Geographically, own wage elasticity is increasing from north to south for all but married
women. The opposite is true for the cross wage elasticity, which numerically decreases for
both husbands and wives. Lastly, households with children are more sensitive to changes
in own wages, regardless of the marital status.
4 Alternative taxation systems
The reform of the taxation system has been a topic of several discussions in the Italian
government. In this section, we use the parameters obtained from the estimation of the
models to simulate the labor force participation rate and the employment rate under three
different taxation systems that have been considered in the political and academic debate.
These are joint taxation, the working tax credit, and gender-based taxation. In Table 15,
Additional file 1: Appendix C, we summarize the main characteristics of these alternative
systems. As the tax reform simulations are performed in a partial equilibrium setting, the
offered wages are considered as exogenously given, and they are unaffected by a change
of tax systems.
An important issue involved in our tax simulation exercises is that when different tax
units and tax systems are considered, the total tax revenue might change. We analyze
what happens to the amount of tax paid by a household in the case of constant total tax
revenue, which is achieved by increasing each household’s tax by a constant amount22.
The results of the simulations are summarized in Table 16, Additional file 1: Appendix C.
4.1 Three simulated reforms
Let us summarize the main characteristics of the three alternative taxation systems.
Joint family taxation: It is currently implemented in Portugal, France and Germany.
It provides tax advantages to large families with low-incomes as the average tax rate
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decreases with the number of household components. As shown by some existing liter-
ature, this system creates a system of negative incentives to participation for both of the
spouses, and especially for women23.
We simulate a taxation system similar to the one we find in France, where the gross
income is the household income divided by the number of parts (the quotient familial,
a coefficients which increases with the number of household components). Let wm and
wf be the gross yearly incomes of the two spouses, q be quotient familial, and T(·)
be the tax schedule. Then, the amount of tax is equal to qT((wm + wf )/q) instead of
T(wm)+T(wf ). In the simulation, we drop all tax credits for dependent spouses and uni-
versal cash transfers. The quotient familial is assumed to equal the number of household
components.
Working tax credit: The American Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the British
Working Tax Credit (WTC) are two systems of negative taxation. The tax unit is the
individual. Based on these systems, households where both of the spouses are employed
have the right to receive a tax credit which is increasing with the size of the family and
which can even become a transfer24. Chote et al. (2007) provide evidence of an increase
from 45 to 55 percent in employment rates of unmarried mothers in Great Britain. Eissa
and Liebman (1996) and Ellwood (2000) obtain similar results for the EITC.
We assume that individual working tax credits amount to 1,840 euros, regardless of the
individual or household income. Moreover, we eliminate the tax credits for dependent
spouses, and we set the universal cash transfers to 137 euros a month for the first child
and 121 euros a month for the following children, regardless of the total household
income25. This proposition is in line with the tax system of several European countries,
and with the suggestions of Atkinson (2011) and Levy et al. (2007).
Gender-based taxation: Alesina et al. (2011) suggest a gender-based taxation system
which implies a lower tax schedule for individuals characterized by a participation rate
elastic to income. In other words, they propose a lower tax rate for women than for men,
regardless of the marital status. They show that this results in a higher participation rate
of women. Moreover, the increase in wives’ bargaining power, due to an increase in their
net disposable income, affects the division of labor inside the household in their favor.
Nevertheless, the gender-based taxation favors high income women and penalizes low-
incomemen. Furthermore, it would imply an equal treatment of two single parent families
identical in income but different in the gender of the parents. Saint-Paul (2007) underlines
that there is no reason to believe that the participation rate of women is always more
elastic than that of men. For example, single women, with and without children, do not
behave differently than men. Alternatively, Saint-Paul (2007) suggests to apply a lower tax
rate to supplemental hours worked, regardless of the gender.
In the simulation, we apply the same tax rates for men and women, but women
only pay 67 percent of their total tax net of standard tax credits, as suggested by
Alesina et al. (2011).
4.2 Results of the simulated reforms










Table 6 Alternative (revenue neutral) taxation systems: differences from the benchmarkmodel
Total Unmarried women Unmarried men Married women Married men Married women
Inelastic husband’s labor supply
Taxation Women Men With Without With Without With Without
System children children children children children children
Participation Rate
Joint Tax -0.48 -0.94 -0.69 +0.10 -0.58 +0.14 -2.71 +0.44 -3.58 +0.51
Working Tax Credit +1.61 -1.53 -1.51 -2.79 +3.06 +1.11 +0.06 -1.39 +0.56 +0.06
Gender-Based Tax +0.89 -4.0 +2.15 -0.83 -0.30 +4.65 -9.97 +2.64 +0.32 +4.0
Employment Rate: Part-time
Joint Tax -4.27 -0.03 -1.90 -0.28 -5.36 -2.74 +0.37 +0.26 -1.87 -0.51
Working Tax Credit +2.63 +0.92 -0.48 -0.07 +1.87 +1.46 +2.38 +0.38 +0.60 +0.55
Gender-Based Tax -3.82 +0.36 -1.06 +0.11 -5.02 -2.02 +0.50 +1.63 -1.52 -0.51
Employment Rate: Full-time
Joint Tax +5.84 -1.21 -0.92 -0.13 +2.72 +1.70 -2.55 -1.28 +0.25 +0.77
Working Tax Credit -2.40 -2.48 -2.72 -2.92 -1.43 -1.91 -2.15 -1.73 +0.05 -0.18
Gender-Based Tax +7.38 -4.17 +2.53 -1.0 +0.96 +3.44 -9.24 -1.25 +1.68 +2.10
Source: Authors’ computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
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In the joint family taxation scenario, participation rates do not show important changes
if husbands and wives decide jointly whether or not to work. On the contrary, labor
force participation of married mothers falls by more than 3 percent if the husbands’
labor supply is inelastic. In Figure 7, which shows the participation rates by level of
education, we can see that when the labor supply of husbands is exogenously given,
low educated mothers leave the labor market at a higher rate than those with college
degrees. Employment rates drop for unmarried individuals, while married women exit
part-time to enter full-time employment27. As shown in Figure 8, Additional file 1:
Appendix D, the SET of married women increases in husband’s income (panels b) and
d)) exhibits higher values than the benchmark model (panels a) and c)), implying a
decreasing labor force participation in husband’s income. The reason is that without
tax credits and universal cash transfers, the SET is now equal to q[T((wm + wf )/q)−
T(wm/q)] /wf , which is positive for every wm ≥ wf and increasing in the difference
(wm − wf ).
But then what are the reasons for the high (and inelastic) labor force participation rate
of French women? Despite the disincentives created by the quotient familial, the French
government provides a wide range of allowances, tax deductions, and reductions in social
security contributions to families with children. For example, an allowance of 50 percent
up to a maximum of 2,300 euros per child under seven years of age is granted towards the
costs of childcare outside of the home. Moreover, a tax allowance of 50 percent is credited
against the costs of assistance with domestic duties, which include childcare. To these
fiscal measures, we should add the widespread system of day-care centers (individual and
collective) for children both younger and older than three years of age,; monetary transfers
to parents who decide to exit the labor market to take care of the children,; and a system




















































































Figure 7 Labor force participation of married women - data vs simulated reforms. Source: authors’
computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
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This set of services (other than fiscal) provide incentives to low-income French mothers
to enter (or to remain) into labor force participation. In Italy, the disincentives created by
the fiscal system are not offset by any other family policy aimed to reduce the burden of
the child care cost.
TheWorking Tax Credit provides incentives to married women who increase their par-
ticipation rate up to 3 percentage points. Contrary to the Italian system, the working tax
credit has all of the characteristics of an individual taxation system. In fact, tax credits
or transfers (and hence, second earner tax rates) do not depend on the spouse’s income
and hence do not vary with the marital status. This is shown in Figure 9, Additional file 1:
Appendix D, panels b) and d), where the SET is constant at about 20 percent for married
women. Similarly, panels a) and c) show that the SET changes only with women’s income.
Another interesting feature of this system is that it provides incentives to undertake low
earnings jobs. As we can see in Figure 9 (panels a) and c)), the SET is particularly low (and
even negative) at low levels of earnings. This prediction can also be seen from Figure 7,
bottom panel, where the raise in labor supply mostly comes from low educated mothers.
The model forecasts a raise in part-time employment rates of married men and women of
about 2 percentage points. Unmarried individuals do not benefit from the simulated tax
system.
Finally, the lower taxation of the Gender-Based system boosts the participation and the
full-time employment rate of all women, especially if they have children. In particular, it
increases participation by about 1 percent and the full-time employment rate by about 7
percentage points. From Figure 10, Additional file 1: Appendix D, we can see that this sys-
tem leads to a decrease in the SET of every woman, even though it maintains a relatively
high SET of low-income married women (as we did not change the system of tax credits
and universal cash transfers). However, the tax credits for dependent spouses and cash
transfers continue to generate the positive correlation between labor force participation
and husband’s income.
Tables 17, 18 and 19 in Additional file 1: Appendix C show the transition flows by edu-
cation level, number of children, and household disposable income of married women
with endogenous husband’s participation decision.
5 Welfare implications
Table 7 reports the Gini coefficients of disposable household income. We find that
inequality in distribution of disposable income decreases for married couples, in both
models, in all of the simulated tax systems but the gender-based taxation if they do not
have children. If there are children in the household, and husband’s labor supply is exoge-
nous, the other reform that decreases inequality is the working tax credit. The highest
increase is experienced by unmarried men and women with children.
In order to evaluate the welfare effects of the estimated and simulated tax systems, we
compute several measures of poverty. In general, the tax system has a pervasive impact
on poverty, both directly through its role in the distribution of society’s resources and
indirectly through its effects on the incentives for economic decisions like working and
saving. We decide to focus on poverty measures as we think that the impact of tax reform
on low-income families is especially important in light of the persistence of poverty, wage
stagnation at the bottom, and the growth of income inequality. Our choice is also moti-









Table 7 Gini coefficients
Unmarried men Unmarried women Married couples Married couples
Joint decision Inelastic husband’s
labor supply
0 children 1 or more children 0 children 1 or more children 0 children 1 or more children 0 children 1 or more children
Benchmark 35.75 40.87 39.56 39.51 32.33 31.36 38.65 38.99
Joint taxation 36.94 60.55 42.31 59.53 34.19 37.05 39.84 43.30
Working tax-credit 38.11 44.48 43.25 43.26 33.60 31.55 38.07 37.60
Gender based tax 35.61 33.51 36.00 36.02 27.24 34.15 31.22 35.33
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documents an increase in the poverty incidence among the households with a worker as
the reference person29.
In our computations, we define yi(j) as the equivalised disposable income of indi-
vidual i in household j, that is, the total income of a household after tax and other
deductions which is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of house-
hold members converted into equalised adults30. The poverty measures are defined as
follows:
(1) Head count index: it measures the proportion of the population for whom income is
below the poverty line31. Let s(j) be the number of members of household j and P be














1 if yi(j) ≤ P
0 otherwise
The head count index has the disadvantage of ignoring the differences in well-being
between different poor individuals.
(2) Poverty gap: it is the average, over all individuals, of the gaps between the income of







[HCi ∗ (P − yi(j))]
(3) Aggregate poverty gap: it measures the average transfer (in euros) to poor households




[ s(j) ∗ max[ (P − yi(j)), 0]
1, 000
]
The results are in Table 8.
In all of the simulations, the joint decision model provides lower poverty measures
than the model with inelastic husband’s labor force participation. Of all the tax systems,
the gender-based system stands out for the lowest poverty measures for any household
composition. The benchmark model and the joint taxation system predict lower poverty
measures for childless couples or households with one child than the tax credit system.
The tax credit decreases the percentage of married couples with two children at risk of
poverty.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used micro data from EU-SILC to estimate two structural mod-
els of labor supply: one with inelastic husband’s labor supply and one with joint couple
decisions. In both models, non-labor income is given, and agents decide, in two stages,
whether to search for a job and whether to accept it or not.
We show that the models match the low level of the Italian labor force participation
and employment rates and replicates the positive correlation between wife’s participation
rate and husband’s yearly income. Moreover, we show that the Italian individual taxation
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Table 8 Poverty measures
Head count Poverty Aggregate




0 children 13.90 137.69 13439.31
1 child 12.81 168.79 17874.27
2 children 12.02 194.08 21906.01
Married (Inelastic husband’s LFP)
0 children 16.71 163.04 16615.21
1 child 15.73 205.91 22153.21
2 children 15.54 248.64 27208.92
Unmarried Men
0 children 28.75 170.91 11712.83
1 child 34.74 344.25 19521.33
2 children 18.60 245.18 25963.36
Unmarried Women
0 children 32.51 193.28 11712.83
1 child 32.07 317.76 19521.33
2 children 53.33 702.86 25963.36
Joint Tax
Married (Joint decision)
0 children 15.64 155.00 17927.00
1 child 18.92 249.34 23842.90
2 children 15.71 253.75 29220.93
Married (Inelastic husband’s LFP)
0 children 16.64 161.89 18337.78
1 child 17.27 224.64 24486.23
2 children 18.29 290.10 30111.85
Unmarried Men
0 children 29.97 172.24 12420.33
1 child 54.93 544.29 20700.47
2 children 23.26 306.48 27531.62
Unmarried Women
0 children 34.85 207.23 12420.33
1 child 52.69 522.15 20700.47
2 children 72.38 953.89 27531.62
Working Tax Credit
Married (Joint decision)
0 children 16.07 159.225 14769.07
1 child 17.73 233.61 19642.85
2 children 9.95 160.68 24073.51
Married (Inelastic husband’s LFP)
0 children 16.54 163.91 16638.86
1 child 15.65 206.30 22129.67
2 children 15.31 247.21 27121.26
Unmarried Men
0 children 31.47 187.08 12832.33
1 child 37.87 375.26 21387.15
2 children 18.60 245.18 28444.91
Unmarried Women
0 children 35.66 212.00 12832.33
1 child 35.81 354.82 21387.15
2 children 49.52 652.66 28444.91
Gender-Based Tax
Married (Joint decision)
0 children 2.22 28.13 3146.27
1 child 1.92 31.12 3838.30
2 children 2.18 45.87 4534.91
Married (Inelastic husband’s LFP)
0 children 2.85 37.72 8581.80
1 child 5.37 82.08 10813.72
2 children 9.87 165.28 13015.35
Unmarried Men
0 children 1.37 18.97 1092.37
1 child 4.07 61.34 1458.27
2 children 4.65 61.30 1786.77
Unmarried Women
0 children 0.99 11.37 1092.37
1 child 4.89 51.89 1458.27
2 children 7.62 100.41 1786.77
Source: Authors’ computations from EU-SILC data (2007-2011).
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system generates disincentives for women’s labor supply, especially when married with
children. This is due to a set of tax credits for dependent spouses and children, universal
cash transfers for children that increase the fiscal burden of low-income households, and
the second earner tax rate of women married to low-income or unemployed men.
We then use the estimated parameters to measure the behavioral effects of alternative
tax systems: joint family taxation, a system inspired by the British working tax credit, and
gender-based taxation. We show that the first implies a substantial drop in the partici-
pation rate of married women. The working tax credit and the gender-based tax systems
boost the participation rate, with the effects of the former being concentrated on unskilled
and low educated women.
Overall, the results of the simulations show that moving towards a system of tax credits
in line with the British or the American ones would reduce the fiscal burden of low earn-
ings workers, mostly married women. Cash transfers that are independent of the total
household income would reduce the disincentives to work created by the Italian taxation
system. We could also expect that providing incentives to take up low-income jobs would
decrease the incentives of taking up irregular jobs.
Endnotes
1The second earner tax is the amount of tax paid on an additional unit of income
when the second earner works relatively to the case in which she is unemployed or out
of the labor force.
2Fertility and child care facilities are mechanisms directly connected to the
participation rate of women. Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain information on
the geographical availability of childcare facilities, which could be a possible cause of the
low participation rate of low-income mothers.
3The French system is characterized by the quotient familial, which has been adopted
since 1945. It aims to make the amount of the income tax proportional to households’
ability to pay. It consists of a coefficient by which the total household revenue has to be
divided. It is a function of the number of household components, and each member has
a different weight depending on being an adult or child. See Saint-Jaques (2009) for a
detailed description of the French system.
4We consider Spain to be the country that most closely resembles Italy, both culturally
and economically, but it exhibits an average tax wedge for married couples which is 10
percentage points lower than in Italy. Data are available from the OECD, Taxing Wages -
Comparative Tables (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AWCOMP).
5The complete table can be found in Additional file 1: Appendix B (Table 11).
6We are referring to the Decreto Legge 10/09/2003 n.276, Legge Biagi.
7 See Table 12 in Additional file 1: Appendix B.
8The description of the data can be found in Section 3.2 and in Additional file 1:
Appendix B.
9A particularly strong assortative matching effect in Italy could generate this positive
correlation. However, it remains to explain why assortative matching is not relevant in
other countries. For a discussion on this issue, see Marcassa (2014).
10As pointed out by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Kleven et al. (2009), the labor
supply of secondary earners is more elastic with respect to taxes than the labor supply of
primary earners.
11TheWorld Value Survey reports that 80 percent of the Italian population, of both
genders, thinks that a child younger than 3 years old suffers if the mother works. Even
though we recognize the importance of these variables in determining the labor supply
decision, we do not include them in our analysis.
Colonna et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:5 Page 27 of 29
12The average tax rate is the ratio between the total household taxes and the gross
household income.
13The gross yearly earnings are chosen to represent the sample average, from Table 13,
Additional file 1: Appendix B.
14The adoption of a discrete choice model is dictated by the evidence that, in Italy,
institutional norms and demand-side rigidities imply concentrations around a limited
number of hour choices (see del Boca (1999)).
15 In our dataset (EU-SILC) each individual is observed for at most five years, thus not
generating enough variation to provide a robust estimation of a dynamic model. We
therefore rely on a simple static model, assuming that yearly wages are a sufficient
statistic for the life cycle earnings profile.
16That corresponds to both one-person households and to the model where husbands’
earnings are taken as given.
17This specification corresponds to the well known “Random utility model (RUM)”.
18The residual  cannot be interpreted as reflecting random preferences due to
unobserved family characteristics. Otherwise, error terms would be correlated across
alternatives. It is better to think of this term as describing observational errors, or
possibly optimization errors or transitory departures from best choice by agents.
19EU-SILC provides two types of data: (1) cross-sectional data pertaining to a given
time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and
other living conditions; (2) longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over
time, observed periodically over a four years period.
20The results of the estimations are available upon request.
21Note that the tax burden is computed on imputed earnings. The static nature of the
model allows us to consider the factors affecting earnings (e.g., accumulated experience)
as exogenous.
22A simulation that does not take this into account shows that the joint tax system
implies a revenue loss of about 18 percent, the working tax credit of about 2 percent,
and the gender-based system of about 11 percent.
23See Buffeteau and Echevin (2003) for France, Steiner andWrohlich (2004) for
Germany, and Aassve et al. (2007) for Italy.
24For example, in the WTC, households with two parents working at least 16 hours a
week can obtain a reimbursement of 80 percent of the child care costs.
25We assume that the transfers for the first and second child are equal to the
maximum amount of transfers guaranteed by the Italian tax system in the two cases.
26The results for the average and second earner taxation rate are relegated to Table 16
in Additional file 1: Appendix C.
27See the transition flows in Table 17 in Additional file 1: Appendix C.
28See Adema and Thévenon (2008) for a discussion of the existing policies directed to
French families.
29The reduction of the population below the poverty line is also a target of
Europe2020, the project of the European Commission.
30See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:
Equivalised_disposable_income.
31The poverty threshold is reported by Istat (2012).
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